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**Are We Too Dumb to Execute Our Own Doctrine?:  
An Analysis of Professional Military Education, Talent Management, and  
Their Ability to Meet the Intent of *The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*.**

by

**Brian T. Watkins**

*Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army*

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
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by Brian T. Watkins

*Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army*

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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
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## ABSTRACT

Over the last 15 years, the U.S. armed forces developed a tremendous amount of joint intellectual capital with multiple strategic and operational deployments in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and other contingency operations, achieving the greatest amount of jointness the organization has seen since the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. With this heightened amount of jointness, the volume of joint intellectual capital in all the services grew. Over 2.5 million service men and women executed combat operations in support of the GWOT through 2014. However, the end of the mission in Iraq and a significant drawdown in Afghanistan see the armed forces ushering in another quasi-interwar period. The loss of force structure and a focus on service-centric survival presents the Joint Force with the potential loss of a significant amount of joint intellectual capital gained during 15 years of combat; a loss that joint professional military education (JPME), in its current form, is not likely to recoup. Based on this loss and the current gaps in the area of joint professional military education and training, the Joint Force will never meet the intent of *The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (CCJO). To stem the loss of joint intellectual capital and prepare the future force to meet the intent of CCJO through the execution of globally integrated operations, improvements need to be made to the services' existing professional military education programs, follow-on leader professional development programs between PME attendance, and career progression and talent management processes used to identify and select officers for joint assignments. Without these improvements, the Joint Force will be too dumb to execute its own doctrine.



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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Over the last 15 years, the U.S. armed forces developed a tremendous amount of joint intellectual capital with multiple strategic and operational deployments in support of the Global War on Terror and other contingency operations. The armed forces achieved the greatest amount of jointness, “joint combat effectiveness through synergy from blending particular service strengths on a mission basis,” the organization has seen since the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986.<sup>1</sup> As General (Retired) Colin Powell mentioned, “We train as a team, fight as a team, and win as a team.”<sup>2</sup>

With this heightened amount of jointness, the volume of joint intellectual capital in all the services grew. Over 2.5 million service men and women executed combat operations in support of the GWOT through 2014. However, the end of the mission in Iraq and a significant drawdown in Afghanistan indicate the armed forces are entering another quasi-interwar period. Decreases in military budgets are forcing the services to focus inward. As a result, each service faces a significant loss of force structure and growing competition between services to secure available resources. The loss of force structure and focus on service-centric survival presents the Joint Force with the potential loss of a significant amount of joint intellectual capital gained during 15 years of combat; a loss that JPME, in its current form, is not likely to recoup.

In the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, the Chairman outlines an approach to warfighting called globally integrated operations designed to “keep America immune to coercion.” The CCJO,

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<sup>1</sup> Don M. Snider, "The US Military in Transition to Jointness," *Airpower Journal* 10, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 16, <https://nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=9708113767&site=ehost-live&scope=site> (accessed on September 2, 2015).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 16.

requires a globally postured Joint Force through the exercise of mission command quickly combining capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons (strategic, operational, and tactical), geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations. This network of partners will form, evolve, dissolve, and reform in different arrangements in time and space with significantly greater fluidity than today's Joint Force.<sup>3</sup>

In essence, the services will need to be more flexible than in the past, with the ability to integrate seamlessly with joint partners and others at a moment's notice.

Based on current gaps in the area of joint professional military education and training, the Joint Force will never meet the intent of *The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*. To stem the loss of joint intellectual capital and prepare the future force to meet the intent of the CCJO through execution of globally integrated operations, improvements need to be made to the services' existing professional military education programs, follow-on leader professional development programs between PME attendance, and career progression and talent management processes used to identify and select officers for joint assignments.

A subjective comparison of PME curriculum was performed using a horizontal and vertical curriculum assessment and gap analysis based on doctrinal outcomes derived from the key elements of the CCJO. The assessment enabled the formulation of recommendations for changes to PME to increase joint capability, understanding, and integration, as well as inculcating joint acculturation earlier in an officer's career.<sup>4</sup>

Interviews with multiple career managers or key personnel from the services' officer personnel management directorates (OPMD), or equivalent, were used to determine best practices and recommendations for metrics in talent management and

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<sup>3</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 2012), 4-7.

<sup>4</sup> See Table 1.1 for a complete listing of the school curricula evaluated.

selection for joint assignments. The interview questions solicited information on service best practices for joint assignment selection, advertisement of available joint billets, service best practices for broadening officers with joint experiences, and career impact for officers serving in joint positions.<sup>5</sup> Responses from multiple interview participants enabled identification of similar and overlapping objective measures of each services' cultural support for jointness, joint assignment selection, and level of importance associated with resident JPME attendance.

**Table 1.1 School Curriculum Comparison**

School Curriculum Comparison	
Officer Initial Entry	Army Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC), Navy Officer Development School (ODS)/Division Officer Leadership Course, Air Force Officer Training School (OTS), the Marine Basic Course
O-3 PME	Army Captains Career Course (CCC), Navy Department Head Leadership Course, Air Force Squadron Officer School (ASOS), Marine Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS)
Staff Colleges/JPME I	Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), College of Naval Command and Staff, Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), Marine Command and Staff College (MCSC)
SSC/JPME II	Army War College (AWC), Naval War College (NWC), Air War College (AWC), Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS), Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS)

Given the limited scope of this research project and the small percentage of joint billets allocated to the Guard and Reserve Components, only the active duty military officer population was used for comparison and to provide recommendations; however, many of the recommendations are likely applicable to Guard and Reserve officers. The Capstone Course and flag/general officer joint management requirements were not part of

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<sup>5</sup> For the full list of interview questions, see Appendix 1.

the review, and correspondence courses were only reviewed to the extent of determining shortfalls for gaining JPME I or JPME II credit without a classroom attendance requirement.

## **CHAPTER 2: WHY JOINTNESS?**

In order to understand the Joint Force’s shortfall in meeting the CCJO’s intent, a historical review of why jointness was deemed critical to U.S military success provides indispensable insight into desired joint officer educational attributes. Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 in large part due to the service parochialism that had gone unabated since the establishment of the Department of Defense in the National Security Act of 1947. Besides the overwhelming amount of existing service parochialism, the armed forces tragically bungled the rescue attempt of U.S. hostages held in Iran in 1980 and ineffectively, albeit successfully, executed the invasion of Grenada in 1983. In addition to streamlining the Defense Department’s chain of command and execution of the joint operations in the future, the act also outlined a Joint Officer Personnel Policy.

Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols outlined the requirement for the Secretary of Defense to establish “policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of the officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps...who are particularly trained in, and oriented to joint matters,” with joint matters defined as “matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces.”<sup>1</sup> The Secretary of Defense determines the number of officers to serve in joint billets, while the Service Secretaries provide nominations for officers to fill those joint billets. The act also outlined promotion requirements for officers actively serving or who had served in joint assignments, requiring promotion rates not less than the rate for officers in the same

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Congress, House, Public Law 99-433, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 99<sup>th</sup> Congress, Title IV.

armed force in the same grade. To check progress and implementation, Congress mandated semi-annual reporting.

## **Joint Professional Military Education**

Besides the establishment of Joint Officer management, the Goldwater-Nichols Act required the Secretary of Defense to ensure “each Department of Defense school concerned with professional military education periodically review its curriculum for senior and intermediate grade officers in order to strengthen the focus on joint matters and prepare officers for joint duty assignment.”<sup>2</sup> An evolving series of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions (CJCSI) further explained joint officer education and management requirements. The most recent instructions are CJCSI 1800.01E, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), dated 29 May 2015, and CJCSI 1330.05, Joint Officer Management Program Procedures, dated 1 May 2008.

The Chairman’s OPMEP outlines his responsibility for the execution of professional military education (PME) and joint professional military educations (JPME) as a subset of that. Officers receive JPME from pre-commissioning to flag/general officer rank. “Services operate officer PME systems to develop officers with expertise and knowledge appropriate to their grade, branch, and occupational specialty. Incorporated throughout service-specific PME, officers receive JPME.”<sup>3</sup> The OPMEP outlines five levels of professional military education: Pre-commissioning, Primary (O-1 to O-3), Intermediate (O4), Senior (O5-O6), and Flag/General Officer. “JPME provides the body of knowledge to enhance performance of duties consistent with Joint Matters

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, CJCSI 1800.01E (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 29, 2015), A-1.

and in the context of joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment).<sup>4</sup>

The OPMEP establishes JPME learning areas for each level of the PME continuum in order to facilitate, build, and improve on six desired leader attributes (DLA):<sup>5</sup>

1. Understanding the security environment and the instruments of national security
2. Anticipating and responding to surprise and uncertainty
3. Anticipating and recognizing change and leading transitions
4. Operating on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding
5. Making ethical decisions based on the profession of arms
6. Thinking critically/strategically and applying joint warfighting principles at all levels of warfare<sup>6</sup>

### **Recent JPME Reviews**

Both Congressionally mandated and CJCS directed reviews of JPME occur routinely. The Joint Staff J7 executed the most recent review of JPME in 2013 after the publication of the Chairman's White Paper on JPME in 2012. This review provided recommendations on the development of the DLAs and sub-attributes to those DLAs outlined in the most recent version of the OPMEP. It also provided the Chairman with information on the gaps in current JPME curriculum and recommendations for improvement.

The Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) endorsed the six DLAs outlined earlier and provided a gap analysis of current JPME programs' ability to train and educate those DLAs. Based on the Council's analysis, JPME adequately teaches and

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., A-1.

<sup>5</sup> Enclosure A to Appendix A to Annex A in the OPMEP provides a graphical representation of the PME continuum.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., A-2, A-3.

assesses DLA 1, DLA 5, and DLA 6; however, there is a significant gap in the education and assessment of DLA 2, DLA 3, and DLA 4. These DLAs teach the ability to anticipate and respond to surprise and uncertainty, the ability to anticipate and recognize change and lead transitions, and the ability to operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding.<sup>7</sup> Although the review does not specifically address it, the gap created implies that JPME is doing a poor job in educating, training, and assessing leader's ability to execute mission command. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 defines Mission Command as "the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission."<sup>8</sup> Understanding and effectively exercising mission command is a critical component to the execution of globally integrated operations as outlined in *The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*.

The review outlined additional recommendations, which fall on the services to implement at their discretion in established PME programs. The Council also identified shortfalls in pre-commissioning joint experiences and primary joint education opportunities. Young officers encounter joint operations earlier in their careers and may not have the education base to implement joint capabilities and joint force enablers effectively at first contact; instead, those officers have to rely on trial and error through on-the-job training to gain the experience needed.

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<sup>7</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Review of Joint Education 2013* (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), 34-35.

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), II-2.

The Council also indicated that JPME I and JPME II curricula need to strengthen education in "cyber warfare, cultural considerations in planning, interagency and intergovernmental operations, information and economic instruments of national power, and operations with private entities."<sup>9</sup> These speak to the heart of today's rapidly changing security environment, necessitating the execution of GIO.

The Chairman and the Council expressed the need for enduring education opportunities for officers. The Council provided a recommendation to offer joint education subjects via correspondence or distance learning, enabling officers to continue their education between required PME attendance.<sup>10</sup> The Chairman outlined a requirement to set time aside during the duty day for individual learning.<sup>11</sup> Currently, the services offer a plethora of on-line and correspondence courses to increase education and training to service members. However, there is a lack of joint subject material available to increase learning and experience outside those service-centric programs.<sup>12</sup>

### **Joint Officer Management**

Due to the haphazard assignment process for joint billets, CJCSI 1330.05 further defines the joint officer management program procedures in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

There are four levels of joint qualification criteria: level one, completion of pre-commissioning and an officer basic course or equivalent; level two, awarded upon accrual of eighteen joint credit qualification points and successful completion of JPME1; level three, awarded upon accrual of eighteen additional joint qualification points, successful completion of JPME 2, and designation as a joint qualified officer, and level four qualification is achieved by flag or general officer upon completion of

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<sup>9</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Review of Joint Education 2013*, 37.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Education White Paper* (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2012), 5.

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Review of Joint Education 2013*, 38.

joint assignment prior to promotion to vice admiral or lieutenant general.<sup>13</sup>

The Instruction also lays out minimum duty assignment lengths for joint designated assignments and provides instructions for officers to apply for joint credit for experience-based joint duty assignments.

Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the joint and combatant command (CCMD) staffs have grown. The Department of Defense added two geographic and two functional commands since 1986, with the activation of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in 2002, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2006, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in 1999, and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in 1992. JFCOM has since been inactivated with its remaining required functions and activities now distributed across the Joint Staff. The combined staffs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, and CCMDs totaled approximately 60,000 military, civilian, and contract personnel in 1988. Armed forces active duty strength at the time was 2.2 million. With the addition of the new CCMDs, the combined staff now numbers approximately 96,000 military, civilian, and contract personnel, while total active duty personnel has contracted to 1.4 million. Of those 96,000 positions, 13,070 are Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) billets, with only 758 designated as critical.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Officer Management Program Procedures*, CJCSI 1330.05 (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1, 2008), B-3, B-4.

<sup>14</sup> Robert P. Kozloski, “Building the Purple Ford: An Affordable Approach to Jointness,” *Naval War College Review*, vol. 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2012), 54-55.

EDUCATION ↓	CADET/MIDSHIPMAN PRECOMMISSIONING	O-1/O-2/O-3 PRIMARY	O-4 INTERMEDIATE	O-5/O-6 SENIOR	O-7/O-8/O-9 GENERAL/FLAG
	SERVICE ACADEMIES ROTC OCS/OTS/DC	BRAANCH WARFARE OR STAFF SPECIALTY SCHOOLS • PRIMARY-LEVEL PME COURSES	AIR Cmd and Staff College -Army Cmd and Genl Staff College -College of Naval Cmd and Staff -Marine Corps Cmd and Staff College -JSFC, Jt & Combined Warfighting School, AFPMF -National Intelligence Univ	Air War College -Army War College -College of Naval Warfare -Eisenhower School -National War College -JSFC, Jt & Combined Warfighting School, AFPMF -JSFC, Jt Advanced Warfighting	CAPSTONE -Jt Functional Component Cmdr Courses -SIUWC -JCOWC -CORE -PINNACLE
LEVEL OF WAR EMPHASIZED	Conceptual Awareness of all Levels	TACTICAL	OPERATIONAL	STRATEGIC	
FOCUS OF MILITARY EDUCATION	-Intro to Service Missions -U.S. Constitution -U.S. Gov't	-Assigned Branch of Staff Specialty -Domain Knowledge (Land, Air, sea, space & cyber)	-Warfighting w/in context of Op Art -Intro to Theater Strategy, Plans, NMFS, NSS -Op Art in All Domains -Joint Leader Development	-Svc School u/ Strategic Leadership/Jt Leader Development -NMFS, Theater Strategy -NSS -Eisenhower: NSS w/emphasis on resource components -All: Theater Strategy & campaign planning, planning procedures and systems, Jlt capability & Int.	-Jt Matters & Nat'l Security -Interagency Process -Multinat'l Ops
CAREER-LONG DEVELOPMENT	Joint Introduction	LIFE-LONG LEARNING SKILLS/SELF-DEVELOPMENT/ADVANCED EDUCATION	JPMET Ph. II	JPMET Ph. II	CAPSTONE
JOINT EMPHASIS	-Nat'l Military Capabilities (in all domains) & Organization -Foundations of Joint Warfare	-Joint Warfare/Cross Domain -Joint Campaigning -Operational Adaptability	-Nat'l Mil Capabilities Cmd Structure & Strategic Guidance -Jt Doctrine & Concepts -Jt & Multinat'l Forces at Operational Level of War -Jt Planning and Execution Process -Jt C2 -Operational Adaptability -Desired Leader Attributes AFPMF	-HEC & NMFS -Nat'l Warfare, Theater Strategy & Campaigning in Jt, US, Intergov't & Nat'l & Jt Environmt Systems and Processes across all domains. -Integration of Jt, US, Intergov't & Multinat'l Capabilities -Desired Leader Attributes -Strategic Adaptability AFPMF	-NSC -Jt Op Art -Jt Func Component Cc courses & NSS -JCOWC -Nat'l Planning Systems & Org -Theater Strategy, campaigning and multi op in Jt, US, Intergov't & Multinat'l Environments -IO PINNACLE
DESIRED LEADER ATTRIBUTES					1. UNDERSTANDING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 2. ANTICIPATING AND RESPONDING TO SURPRISE AND UNCERTAINTY 3. ANTICIPATING AND RECOGNIZING CHANGE AND LEADING TRANSITIONS 4. OPERATING IN INTENT THROUGH TRUST, EMPOWERMENT, AND UNDERSTANDING 5. MAKING ETHICAL DECISIONS BASED ON THE PROFESSION OF ARMS 6. THINKING CRITICALLY/STRATEGICALLY AND APPLYING JOINT WARFIGHTING PRINCIPLES AT ALL LEVELS OF WARFARE

**Table 2.1 Officer Professional Military Education Continuum**

Source: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, CJCSI 1800.01E (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 29, 2015), A-A-A-1.

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## **CHAPTER 3: HEIGHT OF JOINTNESS AND GROWTH OF JOINT INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL**

Over the last 15 years, the armed forces developed a tremendous amount of joint intellectual capital through multiple strategic and operational deployments in support of the global war on terror and other contingency operations. Everett Spain, J.D. Mohundro, and Bernard Banks define “an organization’s intellectual capital as the sum of conceptual assets of its people and represents the organization’s potential to create value.”<sup>1</sup> In 2009-2010, the Department of Defense achieved the greatest level of jointness since the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The services achieved this when counterinsurgency operations reached their pinnacle with the transition from the surge during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to Operation New Dawn (OND) in Iraq and the start of the surge in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Don Snider provides an apt definition for jointness as it relates to the execution of globally integrated operations, “joint combat effectiveness through synergy from blending particular service strengths on a mission basis.”<sup>2</sup> While a rather broad definition, the armed forces have taken full advantage of the opportunity to integrate joint capability in its execution of counterinsurgency operations.

This achievement of jointness was possible due to the change of the Department of Defense’s organization and method of operation mandated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The initial success of the Goldwater-Nichols could be seen with the United States’ lopsided victory in Operation Desert Shield/Storm; however, improvements still needed to be made in joint communication and coordination. After action review (AAR)

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<sup>1</sup> Everett S. Spain, J. D. Mohundro, and Bernard B. Banks, "Intellectual Capital: A Case for Cultural Change," *Parameters* 45, no. 2 (Summer, 2015), 79-80.

<sup>2</sup> Snider, "The US Military in Transition to Jointness," 16.

comments about the planning process provided confirmation of this as “the Army excluded the Marines from much of their ground operations planning.”<sup>3</sup> This was evident in the disjointed maneuver of coalition forces on the ground with the Marines reaching their objectives well in advance of established movement times for the Army’s larger divisions operating to the north and west of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. Even with the stilted maneuver of the coalition, its overwhelming superiority in both numbers and firepower ultimately spelled defeat for Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Army.

General Schwarzkopf heaped praises on the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, enabling him to “establish very, very clear lines of command authority and responsibility for subordinate commanders...producing a much more effective fighting force.” Former CJCS, General Colin Powell observed, “Performance of the Armed Forces in joint operations has improved significantly and Goldwater-Nichols deserves a great deal of the credit.”<sup>4</sup> Of today’s forces, General Dempsey praised their flexibility and adaptability, including the high level of jointness achieved during counterinsurgency operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>5</sup>

Execution of joint operations at all levels, tactical, operational, and strategic, occurred on a routine basis during the height of operations in OIF and OEF. Cross-domain coordination became a matter of routine rather than the exception with the incorporation of layered intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, installation of robust joint level communications infrastructure, seamless coordination with special

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<sup>3</sup> Martin E. Dempsey, “The Future of Joint Operations: Real Cooperation for Real Threats,” *Foreign Affairs*, June 20, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-06-20/future-joint-operations> (accessed on October 7, 2015).

<sup>4</sup> James R. Locher III, “Has it worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,” *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 54, no. 4 (Fall 2001), 110-111.

<sup>5</sup> Dempsey, “The Future of Joint Operations: Real Cooperation for Real Threats.”

operating forces conducting direct action missions, and execution of provincial reconstruction operations with a multitude of inter-governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations.<sup>6</sup>

During the height of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan nearly 280,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines fought in support of combat operations.<sup>7</sup> Total active duty populations for the services rose as well to alleviate the individual and operational fatigue incurred from multiple six, nine, twelve, and fifteen month deployments. The active duty population topped out at 569,186 for the Army, 328,078 for the Navy, 202,779 for the Marine Corps, and 333,243 for the Air Force.<sup>8</sup> Given the routine nature of the combined and joint operations, the armed forces built an incredible amount of joint intellectual capital, which it cannot afford to lose.

### **Inter-War Period: Loss of Intellectual Capital and Increased Service Parochialism**

Since the end of the combat operations in Iraq in 2010, there has been a significant drawdown of U.S. forces and infrastructure with subsequent reductions in the defense budget. With the end of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan looming in 2016, the United States military finds itself in another interwar period, with many similarities to the interwar period between World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII).

At the end of WWI, the nation demobilized the armed forces with over three million service men returning to civilian life. Even though the numbers are not nearly as large today, the United States is reducing the size of the military to a level not seen since

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Congressional Research Service, *Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues by the Congressional Research Service*, July 2, 2009 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2009), 6.

<sup>8</sup> Defense Manpower Data Center, “Active Duty Military Strength by Service,” Department of Defense, [https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp\\_reports.jsp](https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp) (accessed on October 7, 2015).

1940. If the effects of the Budget Control Act are felt in fiscal year 2016, the active duty Army end strength will fall to 420,000, the Air Force will be forced to retire 80 additional aircraft, the Navy will conduct required operations with ten carrier strike groups, and the Marine Corps end strength will fall to 175,000.<sup>9</sup> Without a significant overhaul of JPME at the primary and intermediate levels and changes to the services' current talent management systems, the resultant loss of intellectual capital with the departure of tens of thousands of combat veterans could prove catastrophic to the services' efforts to implement the Chairman's vision for the execution of globally integrated operations.

With the weight of the national debt after WWI and the substantial impact to domestic spending due to the Great Depression, the nation significantly reduced its military spending, falling to fifth in the world in 1938, spending only 2% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. The Army, in particular, struggled to maintain and modernize, using surplus war stocks well into the 1930s.<sup>10</sup> Today, the U.S. maintains a sizeable advantage in what it spends on defense compared to the rest of the world. However, Congress has reduced defense spending to just over 3.5% of the U.S. GDP with projected spending in the next five years falling below 3% of GDP. This reduction is due in large part to the size of the current national debt created by tax cuts implemented in 2001, funding of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the stimulus package initiated to halt the Great Recession in 2008.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2014), IX-X.

<sup>10</sup> Allan R. Millett, "Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period," In *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, ed. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 333-334.

<sup>11</sup> The World Bank, "Data," The World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS> (accessed on October 7, 2015).

Even though more overt service parochialism has lessened since the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, the lobbyists representing the services still maintain service interests in the eyes of the legislators and their constituents. Following WWI, the public's mistrust of standing armies and ineffective public relations and lobbying in Congress led the War Department to emaciate the post WWI Army, trading personnel and modernization dollars to operate a nine division structure with as few as 130,000 personnel.<sup>12</sup> Conversely, the Navy lobby group, the Navy League of the United States, was able to achieve some gains for the Navy in the acquisition of new shipbuilding even with existing treaties limiting naval armament.<sup>13</sup> A recent article from the Association of the United States Army, "Insider Threat: Army Cuts Could Fund Air Force and Navy Modernization," speaks to the existence of service parochialism and inter-service competition existing today, with the Army once again competing for modernization dollars while cutting force structure.<sup>14</sup> This does not account for the intra-service competition for dollars and resources that also exists between branches within the Army.

Doctrine development, as it has in the past, continues unabated, with recent releases of *The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Air-Sea Battle*, and *The Army Operating Concept*. Given those current constructs, it appears inter-service rivalries will still provide some impediment to joint synergy and freedom of action moving forward.

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<sup>12</sup> See David E. Johnson, "From Frontier Constabulary to Modern Army," In *The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941*, ed. Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 169.

<sup>13</sup> Ronald Spector, "The Military Effectiveness of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1919-39," In *Military Effectiveness Volume II: The Interwar Period*, ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin Inc., 1988), 73.

<sup>14</sup> Loren B. Thompson, "Insider Threat: Newest Sacrifice Involves Army Budget Cuts Paying for Navy Ships and Air Force Fighters," *Army* Vol 65, No. 9 (September 2015), 42-44.

All services have their separate interpretations of individual service support to the CCJO and execution of GIO. *Air-Sea Battle* met strong resistance from both the Marine Corps and the Army after its release, due to a failure to include those services in its development. Close analysis of *The Army Operating Concept* identifies the need to maintain the capability to sustain wide area security operations capable of “establishing civil security; security force assistance; establishing civil control; restoring essential services; supporting governance; and supporting economic and infrastructure development.”<sup>15</sup> This is somewhat contradictory to guidance issued in the 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review* which states “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations.”<sup>16</sup>

During the WWI/WWII interwar period, the Army Air Corps did whatever it could to fashion itself as an independent air force, separating itself from any and all missions that would subordinate its forces to the ground maneuver commander.<sup>17</sup> Glimpses of that are still visible today with each service fighting for its own piece of the pie, independently interpreting their roles and importance in future joint force mission execution. This is especially evident in current JPME at the primary and intermediate levels. The services focus their attention on the development of air, land, or sea power experts sometimes at the expense of understanding the application of joint capabilities to achieve cross-domain synergy, a critical element to GIO.

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<sup>15</sup> U.S. Army, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, October 14, 2014), 23.

<sup>16</sup> Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, VII.

<sup>17</sup> Millett, “Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period,” In *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, 353.

## CHAPTER 4: THE CAPSTONE CONCEPT FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

In September 2012, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published *The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*. It provides an overarching framework for how the armed forces will conduct operations in the security environment of the future. In the CCJO, the Chairman describes an approach to warfighting called globally integrated operations designed to “keep America immune to coercion.” There are eight key elements outlined for the successful execution of GIO:

1. Commitment to the use of mission command.
2. Ability to seize, retain and exploit the initiative in time and across domains.
3. Enable and are premised upon global agility.
4. Place a premium on partnering.
5. Provide more flexibility in how Joint Forces are established and employed.
6. Leverage better integration to improve cross-domain synergy
7. Flexible, low-signature or small-footprint capabilities (cyber, space, special operations, global strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) will play more pronounced roles in future joint operations.
8. Joint operations will increasingly discriminate to minimize unintended consequences.<sup>1</sup>

In essence, the services will need to be more flexible than in the past, with the ability to seamlessly integrate with joint partners and others in a moment’s notice.

Reviews of the new doctrine have been mixed. As the Chairman states, 80% of the force structure and resources are already in place for the execution of GIO, leaving only about 20% for changes to modernization, force structure, training, and doctrine.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Dan McCauley, a noted commentator on strategic trends, calls for significant changes across the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel,

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, 4-7.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., iii.

and facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrums for accomplishment of GIO. He states the armed forces in their current form are ill-equipped both materially and intellectually to execute the Chairman's vision successfully.<sup>3</sup> Others have called for changes in existing force structure creating more joint organizations with a professional Joint Officer Corps,<sup>4</sup> or revision of professional military education to better equip future leaders with the knowledge and tools required to execute the concept.<sup>5</sup>

Based on the information contained in the CCJO the future security environment will demand the use of joint forces across echelons, relying heavily on seamless joint force integration to achieve success. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines will need to be able to view potential problems and threats through a joint lens, potentially forgoing a service-centric solution to a problem when other joint capabilities may be available to accomplish the mission.<sup>6</sup> Given the eight critical elements for successful execution of GIO and today's unpredictable security environment, achieving enhanced jointness requires a JPME construct that will highlight joint capabilities and integration despite the fiscal challenges and decreased opportunities to execute joint training that may exist.

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<sup>3</sup> Daniel H. McCauley, "Globally Integrated Operations: A Reflection of Environmental Complexity," *Joint Force Quarterly: JFQ*, no. 71 (Fourth Quarter 2013, 2013), 63-8.

<sup>4</sup> Paul Darling and Justin Lawlor, "Fulfilling the Promise," *Military Review* 92, no. 3 (May, 2012), 82-7.

<sup>5</sup> Rhonda Keister, Robert Slanger, Matthew Bain, and David Pavlik, "Joint PME: Closing the Gap for Junior Officers," *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly* No. 74 (3<sup>rd</sup> Qtr 2014), 65-71.

<sup>6</sup> William O. Odom and Christopher D. Hayes, "Cross-Domain Synergy: Advancing Jointness," *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly* No. 73 (2<sup>nd</sup> Qtr 2014), 123-8.

## CHAPTER 5: CURRENT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION REVIEW

The OPMEP outlines JPME learning areas for each level of the PME continuum in order to facilitate, build, and improve on six desired leader attributes. Below is a list of the learning areas through the Senior level of the PME continuum taken from CJCSI 1800.01E. These learning areas guide curriculum development at PME institutions.

**Table 5.1 Learning Areas**

Education Level	Learning Area	Subject
Pre-Commissioning	1	National Military Capabilities and Organization
	2	Foundation of Joint Warfare and the Profession of Arms
Primary	1	Joint Warfare Fundamentals and the Profession of Arms
	2	Joint Campaigning
Intermediate	1	National Military Capabilities Strategy
	2	Joint Doctrine and Concepts
	3	Joint/Multi-national Forces and the Operational Level of War
	4	Joint Planning and Execution Processes
	5	Joint Command and Control
	6	Joint Operational Leadership and the Profession of Arms
Senior (JPME Phase 1)	1	National Security Strategy
	2	National Planning Systems and Processes
	3	National Military Strategy and Organization
	4	Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy, Campaigning in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multi-national (JIIM) environment
	5	Integration of JIIM capabilities
	6	Joint Strategic Leadership
Senior (JPME Phase II)	1	National Strategies
	2	Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a JIIM Environment
	3	National/Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIIM Capabilities
	4	Command, Control, and Coordination
	5	Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms

Source: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, CJCSI 1800.01E (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 29, 2015), Appendix B to Enclosure E.

## **Pre-Commissioning and Primary PME<sup>1</sup>**

Current pre-commissioning and primary PME differs from service to service.

While most of the commissioning sources cover their respective learning areas, a discrepancy is seen in the primary level of PME. The Air Force and Navy no longer offer a universal basic course for their newly commissioned officers, and the Marine Basic Course focuses only on service-centric topics. The Army is the only service that provides some level of joint education to its lieutenants; however, “Identify Joint Force Structures, Capabilities, and Operations” is only one of 77 tasks accomplished in the basic officer leadership course.

The amount of joint level education improves slightly as officers reach the O-3 rank. The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force dedicate approximately five hours out of a 240-hour core curriculum to joint subjects. The topics range from introduction to service

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<sup>1</sup> Course curricula, calendars, and syllabi were gathered from e-mail communication with respective schools and through the schools' respective internet and intranet sites: Army BOLC, e-mail communication with the TRADOC Center for Initial Military Training, September 24, 2015; Army CCC, e-mail communication with the TRADOC Center for Initial Military Training, September 29, 2015; Army CGSC, e-mail communication with the Department of Joint and Military Operations, September 29, 2015; Army War College, website access at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/experience/academicFocus.htm>, accessed on September 29, 2015; Air Force OTS, website access at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/holmcenter/OTS/Students/line.asp>, accessed on September 29, 2015; Air Force Squadron Officers School and Air War College, website access at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/schools.asp>, accessed on September 29, 2015; Air Command and Staff College, e-mail communication with the Joint Education Directorate, December 11, 2015, and website access at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/schools.asp>, accessed on September 29, 2015; Naval Command and Staff College and Naval War College, website access at <https://usnwc.edu/Academics.aspx>, accessed on September 29, 2015; Marine Corps Basic Course, website access at <http://www.trngcmd.marines.mil/units/northeast/thebasicschool.aspx>, accessed on September 29, 2015; Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfighter Course, e-mail communication with the Academic Office, October 8, 2015; Marine Corps Command and Staff College, e-mail communication with the Curriculum Manager, September 16, 2015, website access at <https://www.mcu.usmc.mil/csc/SitePages/Home.aspx>, accessed on September 29, 2015; Marine Corps War College, website access at <https://www.mcu.usmc.mil/mcwar/SitePages/New%20Students.aspx>, accessed on September 29, 2015; National Defense University, website access at <https://portal.ndu.edu/sites/nwc/SitePages/Academic%20Program.aspx>, accessed on September 29, 2015; Joint and Combined Warfighting School, website access at [https://portal.ndu.edu/sites/JCWS/JCWS\\_Syllabus/Forms/AllItems.aspx](https://portal.ndu.edu/sites/JCWS/JCWS_Syllabus/Forms/AllItems.aspx), accessed on January 5, 2016.

capabilities to Department of Defense Total Force Policy, essentially meeting the needs outlined in the overly broad learning areas for CJCSI 1800.01E.<sup>2</sup> Without joint accreditation requirements at the pre-commissioning and primary levels of education, the services are left to create their own definitions of what constitutes appropriate subject matter for joint curriculum development. Regardless, naval officer PME remains service centric through promotion to O-4, with the first education on joint capability and operations coming during JPME I schooling.

The ASOS lesson on joint capabilities and joint campaigning provides the only course material that specifically addresses the CCJO and GIO with a required reading that breaks down one of the key elements for successful execution of GIO, cross-domain synergy across the armed forces.<sup>3</sup> However, given the fact that this is only one class in a very full curriculum, the ability to retain the information provided for application in a future assignment or operation is unlikely.

### **Service Staff Colleges and JPME I**

Analysis of curricula, syllabi, and academic calendars from each of the service staff colleges reveal an adequate amount of time spent teaching joint subject matter. Each course uses approximately 120 hours to cover subjects ranging from joint functions and the range of military operations to the introduction of operational art and design and the joint operations planning process (JOPP). The schools conduct exercises during the course of the academic year to reinforce learning objectives on joint functions, planning, and principles. Each of the schools handles the format and information taught a little

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<sup>2</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, CJCSI 1800.01E, A-A-6.

<sup>3</sup> Odom and Hayes, "Cross-Domain Synergy: Advancing Jointness," 123-8.

differently; however, the subjects taught are relatively consistent from one school to the next.

To reinforce the importance of joint education at the staff colleges, each maintains its own joint education department, or equivalent, that is highly involved in the development of joint subject curriculum and course material. Unfortunately, given the amount of information that needs to be taught and the limited time allotted to teach it, there are elements critical to the successful execution of globally integrated operations that remain uncovered including *The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* itself.

Each school provides its students with an introduction to strategy where the National Security Strategy, National Organizations, and corresponding documents and subordinate organizations are introduced. None of the staff colleges provides the CCJO as required reading, and the only other document addressing globally integrated operations the students may be assigned is the National Military Strategy (NMS) from 2015. Unfortunately, the NMS leaves GIO ill-defined compared to the CCJO document and the student takeaway is likely the prioritization of military missions that the NMS outlines, rather than how each can be accomplished using GIO:

1. Maintain a Secure and Effective Nuclear Deterrent.
2. Provide for Military Defense of the Homeland.
3. Defeat an Adversary.
4. Provide a Global, Stabilizing Presence.
5. Combat Terrorism.
6. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction.
7. Deny an Adversary's Objectives.
8. Respond to Crisis and Conduct Limited Contingency Operations.
9. Conduct Military Engagement and Security Cooperation.
10. Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations.
11. Provide Support to Civil Authorities.
12. Conduct Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015* (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2015), 10-13.

While each of the schools spend time teaching operational art, operational design, and an introduction to the joint operations planning process, this does not necessarily provide students with the tools required to integrate joint capabilities effectively for the execution of GIO. The schools spend approximately 50 hours in the JOPP subject area, which includes instruction and, in most cases, a joint exercise of some type. One of the eight key elements of GIO stresses the employment of “flexible, low-signature or small-footprint capabilities playing a more pronounced role.”<sup>5</sup> This implies a need to understand not only the joint capabilities available for employment, but also the details in how to integrate them, from deployment, to employment, and redeployment ensuring positive command, control, and communication throughout. Unfortunately, given the time available and the methods used to execute the joint exercises, primarily wargaming or rudimentary simulation, the nuance and detail required for the successful integration of joint forces in the spirit of GIO is inadequate.<sup>6</sup>

The joint planning process taught at the staff colleges emphasizes planning at the joint staff, combatant command (four-star command), and joint task force level (three-star command). This does not offer the fidelity required for the effective planning and execution of GIO at the level students will encounter in their follow on assignments. Most students will find themselves filling key and developmental positions for their services, ultimately commanding or leading a staff of an organization at the tactical level, rather than occupying a position on an operational or strategic level staff. The final product of the staff colleges is largely beholden to their service requirements, producing

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<sup>5</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, 7.

<sup>6</sup> The Marine Command and Staff College uses table top wargaming for joint training, while the Army Command and General Staff College uses simulation based exercises for joint training.

officers who are land, sea, or air power experts that are joint informed rather than joint planning and operations experts. This end result means the level of detail required for successfully integrating joint capabilities at the level outlined by the CCJO is largely left untouched during JPME I education.

### **Senior Service Colleges and JPME II**

Education on the CCJO informing the execution of GIO is similarly ineffective at the senior service college level. While very little of the subject matter covered by course curriculum is service centric except where it applies to joint warfighting, the vast majority of course content covers national level organizations, strategy, and their subordinate counterparts. Course topics range from the theory of war and strategy to non-military instruments of power and national security decision-making. Like their staff college equivalents, the SSCs maintain separate departments responsible for generating and teaching the joint education and joint warfighting curriculum. The focus of the education offered is at the joint operational and strategic level.

Like the staff colleges, the SSCs teach an overview of the National Security Strategy and its related subordinate documents (e.g. the NMS); however, with the exception of JCWS, no other course requires a review of the CCJO.<sup>7</sup> The SSCs are more apt to review *The Joint Concept for Entry Operations* (JCEO), which provides a separate reference to the CCJO.<sup>8</sup> However, like the NMS the JCEO leaves GIO ill-defined compared to the CCJO with the key student takeaway remaining the prioritization of

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<sup>7</sup> Both JAWS and JCWS provide the most thorough review of the CCJO and incorporate GIO in the Joint Operational Planning portion of the curriculum.

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Concept for Entry Operations* (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2014), v.

military missions the NMS outlines rather than how each can be accomplished using GIO.

While the SSCs offer courses with more insight and detail for the implementation of operational art and design and the joint operational planning process, the planning exercises conducted do not identify the integration of joint forces as globally integrated operations even though it may follow the spirit of the intent of the CCJO. Unfortunately, like their staff college counterparts, the SSCs miss the nuance and detail required for the successful integration of joint forces in the spirit of GIO given the time available and the methods used to execute the joint planning exercises.<sup>9</sup>

The joint planning process taught at the SSCs emphasizes planning at the joint staff and combatant command level. This does not offer the fidelity required for the effective planning and execution of GIO at the level most students encounter in their follow on assignments. With the exception of those attending JAWS and JCWS, several students will find themselves filling key developmental positions for their services, ultimately commanding organizations at the low-end operational or the high-end tactical level, rather than occupying a position on an operational or strategic level staff. Given the strategic nature of the education received at most of the SSCs, the level of detail required for successfully integrating joint capabilities at the level outlined by the CCJO just barely skims the surface during JPME II education.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> The Naval War College uses a planning exercise involving a Southeast Asia scenario with the endstate being a campaign design brief to a senior mentor. The Army War College uses a Southeast Asia scenario as well with contingency and operations planning occurring at the seminar level. The Air War College institutes a war game to analyze effectiveness of education received from its Warfighting Course which covers theater campaign planning and education on the JOPP.

<sup>10</sup> Both JAWS and JCWS provide the most thorough review of the CCJO and incorporate GIO in the Joint Operational Planning portion of the curriculum.

During the WWI/WWII interwar period, service schools, such as CGSC and the Army and Naval War Colleges, were the breeding grounds for innovation, developing and testing the concepts and doctrine that would be used to fight World War II. This rarely happens today.<sup>11</sup> The exercises conducted at the staff colleges and SSCs reinforce learning objectives and are based largely on fictional scenarios resident to a particular school or service. Each branch of the armed forces maintains futures and concepts directorates to include the Joint Staff J7, which often reside near respective PME institutions. However, interaction with the student population to develop or test new concepts and doctrine rarely occurs.<sup>12</sup> During the Army's development of a quantitative method to measure training readiness, sitting brigade commanders were brought to Carlisle Barracks, the home of the Army War College, to develop the metrics for the requirement rather than leveraging the experience of the available student population of former battalion/future brigade commanders for the project.<sup>13</sup>

There is also a disconnect in resident versus non-resident SSC with regard to receipt of JPME II credit. Service personnel who complete non-resident SSC do not receive JPME II credit and are required to attend JCWS (an additional 10 week course) to receive JPME II credit. When compared, the curricula between each of the courses varies only slightly. For the Air Force, the non-resident course leaves out only regional and cultural studies and participation in a global challenge wargame, but the non-resident course does include material that is covered by the JCWS course curriculum.

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<sup>11</sup> Henry H. Shelton, "Professional Education: The Key to Transformation," *Parameters*, 31, no. 3 (Autumn 2001), 4-16.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Personal example from assignment as the Deputy Chief of Staff for 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, the Division provided four brigade commanders with temporary duty at Carlisle Barracks to split up the requirement, two of the commanders were in the middle of company and battery command certifications and live fire exercises in preparation for a rotation at the National Training Center.

## **Formal JPME Reviews**

The Joint Staff J7 recently executed a review of JPME in the current fiscal environment. The review determined that JPME curriculum is adequate to meet the requirements of the OPMEP; however, it identified challenges in making JPME attendance a truly joint experience. Service level staff and senior service colleges and to a very limited extent their joint equivalents, NDU (and its SSC equivalent programs) and JCWS, have difficulty in achieving the required student diversity outlined in the OPMEP. As an example, the OPMEP outlines a maximum of 60% attendance of a service's officers at its own staff and senior service colleges with the remaining 40% made up of sister service, intergovernmental/interagency, and international students. The Army routinely populates its CGSC classes with over 75% of its students coming from the Army.<sup>14</sup> Even though the Navy maintains the ability to provide the student diversity outlined in the OPMEP, it operates on a trimester system, enabling Naval officer attendees to start the course at three separate points during an academic year, while their sister service counterparts start in the fall and graduate in the summer. This decreases the level of joint synergy and understanding a small group or seminar might achieve if it were to stay together for the entire academic year.

The review also determined the difficulty of diversifying staff and senior service college faculties with sister service instructors. In his JPME White Paper, the Chairman outlined the requirement to make instructor positions a desired step toward career success.<sup>15</sup> This has not been accomplished at the senior service college level. Even

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<sup>14</sup> David M. Rodney, Jennifer R. Atkin, Sara M. Russell, Edward J. Schmitz, and Dave Gregory, *JPME in the Current Fiscal Environment* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 2015), 18.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Education White Paper*, 5.

though O-6 positions are usually filled by post command (or equivalent) officers, those not selected for command (or equivalent) and subsequently not competitive for promotion to O-6 usually fill O-5 positions. In addition, O-6 selection for instructor assignments is not an indicator of future promotion to general or flag officer. In fact, the opposite appears to be true; from academic years 2011-2014, 25% of Air War College staff or faculty members were selected for early retirement by the Air Force's selective early retirement board (SERB).<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Rodney, Atkin, Russell, Schmitz, and Gregory, *JPME in the Current Fiscal Environment*, 23.

## **CHAPTER 6: JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT AND JOINT ASSIGNMENT PROCESS<sup>17</sup>**

The individual services are the proponent for filling joint assignments received through the Joint Staff J1. Each branch of service maintains a Joint Assignments office in their officer personnel management directorate or equivalent that distributes these joint assignments to the career managers, assignments officers, or detailers dependent on the service. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps maintain a published manning level, usually produced annually, for the assignment of their officers to the joint duty assignment list billets provided for fill by the J1. For the Army, JDAL fill is between 80-90% with the Marine Corps filling to 85%. The Joint Staff J1 provides a prioritized list of the JDAL assignments so the higher priority billets are filled first.

There are no particular best practices from the services with regard to joint billet selection. However, it appears the Air Force may place more of a premium on joint assignment selection than the other services, filling their required JDAL billets to nearly 90%. Based on the career management models provided by the services, the first opportunity for joint broadening usually occurs as an O-4 anywhere between the twelfth and sixteenth year of service. Joint opportunities may be available earlier; however, joint

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<sup>17</sup> Information for this chapter of the paper was obtained through telephonic interviews with a minimum of two personnel from each of the armed services. For the Army, interviews were conducted with two personnel from the Officer Personnel Management Directorate of Human Resources Command on October 27, 2015, and November 23, 2015. For the Air Force, interviews were conducted with two personnel from the Air Staff A1 Office on December 1, 2015, and December 10, 2015. For the Navy, interviews were conducted with two personnel from the Navy Personnel Command, Officer Detailing Office, on October 27, 2015, and November 24, 2015. A U.S. Navy Personnel Command Line Officer Community Brief was accessed through the NPC's website, <http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/boards/activedutyofficer/Pages/CommunityBriefs.aspx>. For the Marine Corps, interviews were conducted with two personnel from the Manpower and Reserve Affairs Officer Assignments Office on November 20, 2015, and December 18, 2015. The *U.S. Army Human Resources Command Executive Brief* (dated June 24, 2015) was received via e-mail through OPMD on November 23, 2015. The Marine Manpower Officer Assignments road show was accessed through the office's website, [https://www.manpower.usmc.mil/portal/page/portal/M\\_RA\\_HOME/MM/A\\_OA](https://www.manpower.usmc.mil/portal/page/portal/M_RA_HOME/MM/A_OA), accessed on November 20, 2015.

assignment as an O-3 would not be to a JDAL position (reserved for O-4 and above). Conversely, the services may opt to fill their needs first (i.e. service nominative jobs) if joint placement could potentially jeopardize an officer's competitiveness for an O-5 command assignment or a service assignment has a higher priority for fill than an open JDAL billet.

Each of the services use similar methods for the advertisement of joint assignment availability. Career managers post available assignments to their web sites for consideration by officers available to move. While all the services attempt to fill JDAL assignments with what would be considered above center of mass officers (top 49% or better), it is not always possible. Career timelines are almost always an issue when considering joint assignment placement, and an officer's successful advancement still relies on performing well in service designated key developmental positions at each grade. While the promotion rate for those serving or who have served in joint billets must be equivalent to their service counterparts, officers will not be competitive for promotion until they have successfully completed an assignment in their service's key developmental position at their current grade. Hence, the reasoning and advertisement of joint assignments following completion of those key developmental assignments.


Overall, joint assignment selection and placement is inconsistent at best. Individual service's needs usually come first unless an officer requires joint qualification for potential promotion to general or flag officer. Also, inside the services the different career fields place a different premium on joint assignments and experience. This is readily seen in a brief generated by the Navy Personnel Command, where each of the career fields highlights the desired attributes for officers competitive for the rank of

Captain. Eight out of eighteen career fields specifically state joint experience or joint qualification completion, highlighting the importance that joint assignments factor in to possible advancement.

All of the services profess that officers serving in joint billets remain competitive for advancement later in their careers (e.g., promotion, command or equivalent billets, flag officer promotion potential). Each service provides its promotion board panels with instructions on joint assignment expectations and potential differences in sister service methods for evaluating and communicating performance. Officers who have served in joint assignments sit on those boards as well. Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) status, completion of JPME I and II and three-year assignment to a JDAL billet, remains a requirement for promotion to general or flag officer. Service career managers are keenly aware of this requirement; however, this may result in joint placement of these superior officers much later in their careers, post O-5 command or equivalent assignment and prior to O-6 command or equivalent billet.


As mentioned earlier, the services prefer assigning above average officers to joint positions, but this does not always occur. Based on the number and timing of available joint O-5 billets, they are often filled by lieutenant colonels and commanders passed over for promotion, command, or equivalent positions. While many are still high caliber officers, most are not competitive for promotion to O-6. Unfortunately, the joint assignment will not make them more competitive for promotion, command, or senior service college selection.

**Figure 6.1, Army Officer Career Model**




Source: U.S. Army, *U.S. Army Human Resources Command Executive Brief* (Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Army HRC, June 24, 2015), 25.

**Figure 6.2, Naval Aviation Officer Career Progression**



Source: U.S. Navy, U.S. Navy Personnel Command Line Officer Community Brief (Millington, TN: USNPC, January 2016), 12.

**Figure 6.3, Example Marine Career Progression**



Source: U.S. Marine Corps, Example Marine Career Progression (Quantico, VA: MMOA, December 18, 2015).

## **JPME Selection and Attendance**

All of the services execute boards for the selection of the best available officers to attend resident staff and senior service college or equivalent schooling. However, not all the services ensure attendance nor place a premium on it. This ultimately detracts from the quality of the officers in attendance, potentially making this joint experience, less joint, and less effective. The needs of the service or the career timeline of the service member are often at odds with the 12 months required to complete a resident program. During the peak U.S. involvement in OIF and OEF, the Army often deferred attendance to its Intermediate Level Education (ILE) program (CGSC), keeping majors in the service's key developmental positions until they required the schooling for promotion to lieutenant colonel.<sup>18</sup> The Navy does not stress attendance either. Based on career timing, it could be detrimental for a Navy officer to extend shore duty to attend a resident staff college or a SSC in lieu of taking the opportunity to serve in a required or additional key developmental position.

## **Best Practices**

The armed forces as a whole make a significant effort to broaden quality officers through the use of scholarships, fellowships, and internships. These positions give the selected officers experience operating in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, or multi-national environment providing them a solid base for understanding and integrating GIO. While each service handles the selection process for these opportunities differently, it is apparent from the selection criteria that the best officers are selected to participate. These opportunities are offered to senior O-3s, O-4s, and O-5s. The Army uses separate

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<sup>18</sup> Robert H. Scales, "Too Busy To Learn," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 136, no. 2 (2010): 30-35.

panels for selection, while the Marines incorporate selection in their Corps Career Level Education Board, Professional Intermediate-level Board, and their Top Level Schooling Board.

Some of the joint opportunities and career broadening positions are Congressional Fellowships, Cyber Command Scholarships, Arroyo Center Fellowships, Asia-Pacific Center Fellowships, CGSC Interagency Fellowships, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Service Chiefs Internships, Olmsted Scholars Program, Marshall Center for Security Studies Fellowships, JCS/OSD Internships, and White House Fellowships. These positions usually provide the officer with an advanced degree from a major college or university with potential for follow-on assignments to the Office of the Congressional Legislative Liaison (OCLL), the Rand-Arroyo Center, interagency positions, DARPA, foreign partners, NATO, the Joint Staff, and the White House to list just a few.<sup>19</sup>

Unfortunately, these opportunities provide only a very small number of top-quality officers with JIIM experience that can be translated into the application of GIO. Based on the CJCS directed JPME review in 2013, “there continues to be a disconnect between education opportunity (JPME) and experience (joint duty assignments).”<sup>20</sup> The MECC implored the services “to explore earlier determination of follow-on assignments from education to allow tailoring of educational opportunities, recognizing that experience is critical to fully develop the desired learning attributes in service

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<sup>19</sup> U.S. Army Human Resources Command, “Broadening Opportunities Program Catalog,” U.S. Army, <https://www.hrc.army.mil/officer/broadening%20opportunities%20program%20catalog> (accessed on December 1, 2015).

<sup>20</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Review of Joint Education 2013*, 38.

members.”<sup>21</sup> It is incumbent upon the career managers to place the services’ best in JDAL billets, and it is incumbent upon the service chiefs to place a premium on joint duty as well as JPME attendance. This will ensure officers have a wealth of experience to draw on, both through JPME attendance and joint assignment opportunities, when asked to plan and execute globally integrated operations throughout the course of their careers.

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 39.

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## CHAPTER 7: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Findings

Based on the current gaps in the area of joint professional military education and training, and the cultural biases that exist in the services' talent management systems, the Joint Force will never meet the intent of *The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*. The gap in education starts before an officer's career even begins, during pre-commissioning, and continues during an officer's primary level of education. Only rudimentary service capabilities, national and service chains of command, and an introduction to regional combatant commands occurs during pre-commissioning with primary education receiving only five to ten hours of joint training out of nearly 500 hours in the classroom. The subjects again cover only the wave tops, focusing primarily on sister service structures and capabilities with joint campaigning mixed in.

JPME I schooling offers a significant increase in joint specific training, but again the level of training does not necessarily match what is required for successful integration of joint capabilities during a student's next assignment. Classes focus largely on joint level operational planning conducted by the Joint and CCMD staffs, but differs from the service level planning processes the officers will use at their follow-on assignments. Even with JPME I complete, follow-on assignments are not necessarily joint in nature, and the officer usually returns to their service to fill a key developmental position in a tactical level unit of employment. Their first opportunity to employ the tools gained during their JPME I education is a joint or broadening assignment following the satisfactory completion of their service's key developmental assignment.

There is no guarantee the officer will move to a joint assignment. Joint assignments are not the highest priority fill for any of the services unless it is one of the 758 critical JDAL billets.<sup>1</sup> While each service chief provides specific manning guidance to their teams, joint billets are usually filled to 85-90% with the Joint Staff J1 providing the services with a prioritized list for fill from each CCMD Staff J1. The services rarely fill joint billets for the joint team's sake; it is often done for the sake of the individual officer who requires joint qualification to remain competitive for promotion to flag or general officer.

While most of the services hold selection for resident attendance at staff and senior service college with higher regard, not all of them do. Even though special boards and panels are used to select personnel for resident attendance, the Navy places no significant weight on actual attendance, which could ultimately interfere with an officer's career progression if the timing for school attendance is not right. Unfortunately, this and the overpopulation of service staff colleges by a single service, take away some of the joint benefits gained from resident schooling.

Those joint benefits are not just beholden to the student population; the faculty population enhances the joint learning environment as well. Filling joint billets at the service staff colleges has been difficult at best, and the competitive edge for promotion and advancement is often lost when a senior officer at the O-5 or O-6 level takes a teaching assignment over and above a service or joint staff level or nominative assignment.<sup>2</sup> The effects of service parochialism have decreased significantly since the

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<sup>1</sup> Kozloski, "Building the Purple Ford: An Affordable Approach to Jointness," 54-55.

<sup>2</sup> Rodney, Atkin, Russell, Schmitz, and Gregory, *JPME in the Current Fiscal Environment*, 23.

passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but they are clearly seen in the services' personnel and talent management systems.

The learning gap created from the start of an officer's career is not filled through professional military education even if the officer is selected for attendance at a senior service college or equivalent school. While senior service college curricula are largely joint in nature, the focus on national level strategy and organizations often overshadows theater level strategic planning that provides the perfect opportunity to incorporate the use of globally integrated operations. Like their staff college counterparts, there is a tremendous amount of information to cover during the academic year, to include individual level research projects that may take away the opportunity to explore the joint operations planning process and the implementation of globally integrated operations in more detail.

The single most glaring issue for the training and education of the Joint Force on the CCJO is that it is not a part of most staff college or SSC course curricula.<sup>3</sup> The concept of globally integrated operations is briefly covered in the 2015 National Military Strategy and *The Joint Concept for Entry Operations*. There is no implementation guidance for the CCJO, and there has been no follow-on release of changes to joint doctrine affected by the CCJO. During the WWI/WWII interwar period the armed forces relied heavily on the service schools (i.e., CGSC, AWC, and the NWC) to implement and experiment with new concepts and doctrine. The students developed the tactics, techniques, and procedures for employment of those concepts and conducted exercises to

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<sup>3</sup> Both JAWS and JCWS provide the most thorough review of the CCJO and incorporate GIO in the Joint Operational Planning Process portion of the curriculum.

refine and improve them.<sup>4</sup> This is no longer handled by the student population, but by personnel in concepts and futures directorates in the J7 and individual services. While those directorates may be co-located with PME schools, they rarely, if ever, involve student populations in concept development, exercises, or experimentation.

## **Recommendations**

Many of the recommendations offered to alleviate the loss of intellectual capital and increase the armed forces capability to execute *The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, even with the shrinking of military force structure, are not new. The committees assigned to conduct formal JPME reviews or other authors offering opinions on how existing JPME needs to be revised have proffered similar recommendations. The Chairman stated his intent, stressing the importance of JPME from both the learning and teaching perspective, providing clear direction to the force on how to execute, yet there continue to be shortfalls.<sup>5</sup>

JPME at all levels needs revision. Joint acculturation must start earlier, and the touchpoints for joint learning must be exercised throughout an officer's career. It starts with pre-commissioning. The armed forces should employ a joint force structure for the Reserve Officer Training Corps, with accession to the individual services after two years of broad joint education.<sup>6</sup> It continues during primary education with all the armed services required to provide initial entry training after commissioning. Joint subjects covered during this training must be applicable to the level of joint integration the new lieutenant or ensign might expect to see at their next assignment.<sup>7</sup> For example, Army

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<sup>4</sup> Shelton, "Professional Education: The Key to Transformation," 4-16.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Education White Paper*.

<sup>6</sup> Keister, Slanger, Bain, and Pavlik, "Joint PME: Closing the Gap for Junior Officers," 69.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 70.

aviators should receive instruction on joint fires, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), joint airspace command and control (AC2) and joint sustainment applicable to the attack, reconnaissance, air assault, and air movement missions they might perform as platoon leaders. Reinforcement would occur during primary level PME.


The first opportunity for broadening at the Joint or CCMD staff level would occur for select O-3s who have completed key and developmental assignments for their service. Once promoted to O-4, officers would complete their key and developmental assignment for their service at that grade to ensure competitiveness for promotion *before* attending a command and staff college. While the services have prioritized selection for resident staff college attendance, they must also place a priority on actual attendance. The curriculum for the staff colleges would change slightly, providing both JPME I and JPME II level education, through the incorporation of a modified 10-week JCWS curriculum into the staff college academic calendar. The CCJO and the execution of GIO would be an area of study and trained through the use of practical exercise and simulation. Follow on assignments from the staff college would be to operational and strategic level staffs. If an assignment to an operational or strategic level staff is considered a required key and developmental position for certain career fields at the O-4 grade, then attendance at staff college should occur shortly after promotion.

Joint and broadening opportunities would open up again after O-5 command or equivalent assignment, and SSC attendance would not occur until after O-6 command or equivalent assignment. SSC curriculum focus would remain strategic in nature, centered squarely on national level policy and strategy and its effects on the OSD, Joint Staff, and

CCMD's strategy and plans development. With the JCWS curriculum integrated in the staff college curriculum, less time would be spent teaching JOPP concepts providing more time for strategic leadership topics and individual research assignments.

It is incumbent on the DOD to standardize talent management practices across the services and place a higher priority on assignments to joint level positions ensuring the application of CCJO principles and the application of GIO in joint planning. This includes the prioritization of teaching positions at the staff and senior service colleges. Instructors who remain relevant and competitive for promotion not only provide invaluable education to the student population, but also serve as mentors developing the armed forces' future operational and strategic leaders. Figure 6.1 provides a graphic representation of an officer's career timeline using this paradigm.

**Figure 7.1, Recommended Officer Career Progression**



In addition to the changes to current JPME, the armed forces need to leverage the schoolhouses and the student population to develop and exercise future concepts and doctrine. The exercises performed at all levels of PME need to be linked to existing joint and service exercises or to the futures, concepts, and doctrine divisions of the services and joint staff. The output of the exercises needs to have meaning beyond the reinforcement of learning objectives. Student populations are a captive audience who are motivated when their work results in changes to the way the services execute their mission or are tied to real world solutions to the current challenges the military faces.

As the Chairman stated in his White Paper on JPME, learning is a career long endeavor.<sup>8</sup> It needs to happen not only in the formal PME and JPME environments, but also through routine touch points and injections throughout an officer's career. Ultimately, promotion and advancement needs to be tied to joint educational requirements similar to the method used by the Army's Non-commissioned Officer Education System. This would require officers to register and continue their education through distance learning on joint service subjects developed by the staff colleges, service SSCs, and NDU as directed by the Joint Staff J7.<sup>9</sup>

Given the current service biases toward joint assignment and attendance at resident staff colleges and SSCs, legislation will likely need to be enacted to force the changes that need to be made. The services loosely follow the Chairman's guidance; however, it cannot be strictly enforced without an injection from civilian and political leadership forcing change in organizations that are often resistant to it.

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<sup>8</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Education White Paper*, 5.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Review of Joint Education 2013*, 37.

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## **CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION**

The Joint Force will never meet the intent of *The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* based on current gaps in the area of joint professional military education and training. To stem the loss of joint intellectual capital and prepare the future force to meet the intent of the CCJO through execution of globally integrated operations, the Department of Defense needs to mandate the improvement of the services' existing professional military education programs, follow-on leader professional development programs between staff and senior service college attendance, and career progression and talent management processes used to identify and select officers for joint assignments. In addition, the Joint Staff must codify the concepts laid out in the CCJO in existing Joint Doctrine, ensuring JPME I and II education provides comprehensive study and practical exercise on the execution of globally integrated operations.

Based on the information contained in the CCJO, the future security environment will demand the use of joint forces across echelons, and rely heavily on seamless joint force integration to achieve success. This requires the armed forces to begin joint education and acculturation much earlier in an officer's career, to include establishing routine touch points to reinforce learning on joint capabilities and integration at all levels: tactical, operational, and strategic.

Increasing Joint Force integration, maintaining, and building the joint intellectual capital required to meet the intent of *The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* will require each branch of the armed forces to modify their current professional military education programs, specifically improving education on joint capabilities and integration. This adjustment includes establishing routine touchpoints in between PME

attendance to reinforce and increase learning, and tailoring the joint assignment selection process to better manage talent and place the best qualified officers in joint positions.

Given the anticipated dynamic operating environment, Joint service during the course of a military career should become the rule rather than the exception. Only then will the Joint Force be smart enough to execute its own doctrine.

## **APPENDIX 1: INFORMED CONSENT REQUEST FOR INTERVIEWS**

October 21, 2015

To whom it may concern:

I am conducting a research project analyzing current professional military education and talent management processes to determine how well each meets the armed forces' ability to achieve the intent of the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations published in 2012. I am conducting interviews with personnel in the Officer Personnel Management Directorate (or equivalent) for each of the services. Here are the baseline questions I plan to use for the interview.

1. What do you feel your service's best practices are for joint billet selection?
2. How is information disseminated to advertise available joint billets and/or PME opportunities?
3. In your opinion what do you feel your service does well to broaden officers with joint experiences?
4. Do officers serving in joint billets remain competitive for advancement later in their careers (i.e. promotion, command or equivalent billets, flag officer potential)?

I am required to gain consent from each person I interview. Interview participation is strictly voluntary. I plan to attribute information and best practices received by service rather than by individual. I will acknowledge interview participation in my thesis as well.

Please sign, scan and e-mail the enclosed Informed Consent form to me prior to execution of the interview. Thank you for your time.

Sincerely,

//ORIGINAL SIGNED//

Brian T. Watkins  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army  
JAWS Student

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## GLOSSARY – ACRONYMS

AAR	After Action Review
AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
AC2	Airspace Command and Control
ACSC	Air Command and Staff College
ASOS	Air Force Squadron Officer School
AWC	Air War College
AWC	Army War College
BOLC	Army Basic Officer Leadership Course
CCC	Army Captains Career Course
CCJO	Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
CCMD	Combatant Command
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
EWS	Marine Expeditionary Warfare School
GIO	Globally Integrated Operations
GDP	Gross Domestic Project
IETC	Initial Entry Training Course
ILE	Intermediate Level Education
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JAWS	Joint Advanced Warfighting School
JCWS	Joint and Combined Warfighting School
JFCOM	U.S. Joint Forces Command
JFSC	Joint Forces Staff College
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multi-National
JOPP	Joint Operations Planning Process
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JQO	Joint Qualified Officer
KD	Key and Developmental
MECC	Military Education Coordination Council
MCSC	Marine Command and Staff College
MWC	Marine War College
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDU	National Defense University
NORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command
NWC	National War College
NWC	Naval War College
OCLL	Office of the Congressional Legislative Liaison
ODS	Navy Officer Development School
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OND	Operation New Dawn
OPMD	Officer Personnel Management Division
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTS	Air Force Officer Training School
PME	Professional Military Education
SERB	Selective Early Retirement Board
SSC	Senior Service College
STRATCOM	U.S. Strategic Command

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## **VITA**

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Watkins graduated from the University of Virginia and was commissioned in Army Aviation in May 1995. After completion of Officer Basic Course, flight training, and the OH-58D Qualification Course, he served in leadership, command, and staff assignments from platoon to division level at Ft. Stewart, Georgia, Ft. Knox, Kentucky, Wheeler Army Airfield, Hawaii, and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. He has deployed to Kuwait (Desert Thunder), Bosnia (Joint Forge), Iraq (OIF 2, OIF 07-09), and Korea. LTC Watkins most recent assignments include Squadron Command of the first rotational unit deployed to the Republic of Korea, and service as the Deputy Chief of Staff for the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.